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I am very grateful for the many very generous remarks that the five commentators have
made about my work, and grateful, too, for the searching criticisms to which they have
subjected it. I will do my best to respond to these criticisms.
Krzysztof Kościuszko declares that my programme to transform universities so that the
basic task becomes to seek and promote wisdom is “beautiful and noble” but also,
unfortunately, unrealizable and utopian. I deceive myself in thinking the outcome would
be that the wealthy would give to the poor, and the young would be able to stop the
extinction of species, war, and pollution.
However, Kościuszko has massively inflated and exaggerated what it is that I argue
for. It is as if he interprets me as arguing that, in order to create a wiser world it is
sufficient to transform universities so that they come to put wisdom-inquiry into practice
(wisdom-inquiry being the conception of inquiry I argue for). Given that interpretation of
my argument, Kościuszko’s criticisms make complete sense. How could transforming
academia of itself suffice to solve the problems of the world – inequality, war, pollution,
extinction of species and the rest? Utopian nonsense!
But that is not my argument. At most I argue, far more modestly, that, in order to
create a wiser world it may be necessary to transform universities. Without our
institutions of learning being rationally designed and devoted to helping us make progress
towards a wiser world, it may not be possible for us actually to make progress towards
such a world. Wisdom-inquiry does not, in other words, remotely guarantee success in
the real world. Academia might be utterly devoted to promoting wisdom, and it might be
ignored by the rest of the world so that we continue to blunder from one disaster to
another, as we do at present. On the other hand, if we are to create a better world, we
need to learn how to do it, and that may require our institutions of learning are well-
designed to help us learn how to do it.
But even this much more modest statement of my argument may overstate what it is
that I argue for. Perhaps wisdom-inquiry is not even necessary for us to make progress
towards as good a world as possible. Learning, fortunately, is not confined to institutions
of learning. Perhaps humanity can learn how to tackle our grave global problems more
effectively, intelligently, and humanely even without universities being rationally
devoted to helping with the task.
My actual argument, even more modestly, is that, granted we seek to make progress
towards as good a world as possible, it can only help to have our institutions of learning
rationally designed to help with the task, and can only hinder us to have institutions of
learning that are damagingly irrational when judged from this standpoint – as at present.
Kościuszko does not call into question my central argument. He calls it “beautiful and
noble”. Knowledge-inquiry, by and large what we have at present, is damagingly
irrational, in a wholesale, structural way, when judged from the standpoint of helping to
promote human welfare, helping us to realize what is of value in life, make progress
towards a good world. In order to cure knowledge-inquiry of its damaging irrationality,
we need to change it so that it becomes wisdom-inquiry. About this much, we agree.
But that suffices, I claim, to make it a matter of supreme urgency to bring about the
revolution I call for. Global warming, population growth, the lethal character of modern
war, habitat destruction and rapid extinction of species, depletion of vital natural
resources all indicate that we face an impending global crisis. Humanity urgently needs
to discover how to tackle its problems in wiser ways than at present. There can be no
doubt that academia has an impact on society – via education, scientific and technological
research, the media, training of doctors, engineers, lawyers and other experts, and expert
advice and recommendations to government departments, industry and other influential
institutions. Wisdom-inquiry, with its emphasis on public education by means of
discussion and debate, would greatly enhance this impact. Even those dubious of the
scale of the impact of academia on society must nevertheless admit that it does have a
major impact in the long term. An industrially advanced society would, before long,
begin to deteriorate if all its universities were abolished overnight. Even if we faced no
grave global problems, it would still be important to have universities rationally devoted
to the promotion of what is of value in life by intellectual and educational means. That
we do face grave global problems makes the matter all the more important. If academic
inquiry, as conducted at present in our universities, is damagingly irrational in a
wholesale, structural way, then it must be a matter of urgency to put the matter right.
This is not utopian. It is common sense.
Kościuszko fails to distinguish two very different potential revolutions before us.
There is, first, the academic revolution: to transform academia so that knowledge-inquiry
becomes wisdom-inquiry. Then, there is the global revolution: to transform the world so
that problem-solving and aim-oriented rationality are put into practice in life intelligently
and humanely at all levels: individual, institutional, social, national, global.
Above, I have interpreted Kościuszko as accusing me of utopianism in holding that the
first revolution is sufficient to bring about the second – a thesis I very definitely do not
hold. But I might be accused of utopianism on very different grounds, namely, for
holding that it is possible to bring about the first revolution in our world as it is – quite
apart from questions about any impact that revolution might have. It is utopian, it may be
argued, to suppose that governments, corporations, establishment bodies, professional
groups, even the public, would permit academics to transform universities so that they
begin to put wisdom-inquiry into practice. How do I respond to this charge?
At the time of writing (2012), wisdom-inquiry is simply not on the agenda. Very few
academics are aware of the argument that knowledge-inquiry – by and large what we
have at present – betrays both reason and humanity, there being an urgent, coherent,
decisive case for change. Many academics are unhappy with academia as it exists today,
on various grounds. There are at present many diverse initiatives to change aspects of
academia in the direction of wisdom-inquiry – as I indicated towards the end of my
article “The Menace of Science without Civilization” (to be referred to as “Menace” in
what follows). What is entirely lacking, at present, is awareness of the argument for the
need to transform knowledge-inquiry into wisdom-inquiry.
Let us suppose that the case for change becomes better known. Is it utopian to suppose
that the academic might begin to implement the structural institutional/intellectual
changes needed for knowledge-inquiry to become wisdom-inquiry?
The great irony is that the greatest opponents of such a programme of academic change
would undoubtedly be – academics! The very people who should seek to defend the idea
that reason should be devoted to the interests of humanity are the ones most likely to
oppose the idea, if confronted by it. Natural scientists will oppose abandoning the view
that evidence alone decides what is accepted and rejected in science. They will oppose
natural science playing second fiddle to social inquiry. Social scientists will oppose
transforming social science into social philosophy or social methodology – the central
task of social inquiry being to promote cooperatively rational tackling of problems of
living in the real world. Many academics will oppose the change of status academia
would encounter in becoming the public’s civil service, doing for people openly what
actual civil services are supposed to do, in secret, for governments. Those with
established reputations in academia will oppose the “knowledge to wisdom” revolution
because it would pose a threat to their established work and reputation. Fledgling
academics will oppose the revolution because it would threaten their efforts to achieve an
academic career. Academia, ostensibly all about innovation and discovery, is
nevertheless massively resistant to change when what is at issue is changes to the rules of
the academic enterprise which decide what is to count as an academic contribution, what
is to count as academic excellence. Thomas Kuhn has written powerfully on resistance to
scientific revolutions in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.1
But despite massive initial opposition, intellectual revolutions do, nevertheless, from
time to time, occur. Let us suppose a critical mass of academics, including those at the
top, agree that wisdom-inquiry needs to be put into academic practice. Would the rest of
the world allow it to happen?
There is no doubt in my mind that, if ever matters reach this stage, there will be
massive opposition from governments, industrial and financial bosses, pundits in the
media, and many members of the public. Universities, whether publicly or privately
funded, would be threatened with withdrawal of funding. Research in natural science –
so expensive – would be especially threatened. Governments, management, pundits and
members of the public will be outraged at the idea that academics should explore
questions about how people should live, what values and ideals people should adopt and
pursue in life, what actions governments should take, what policies should be adopted by
governments, industry and financial institutions, what public expenditure should be on
health, defence, welfare, science and education, infrastructure, foreign aid, what
legislation should be enacted, what changes should be made to foreign policy – all
matters, many will hold, that lie beyond professional academic competence. The job of
academics, it will be maintained, is to acquire knowledge, not advise the rest of us how
we should live, what we should do, what policies we should pursue, what values act on
and live by, what actions take.
In dictatorial countries wisdom-inquiry would be quite impossible – although, it
deserves to be noted, knowledge-inquiry often manages to flourish quite well (as it did,
for example, in the old Soviet Union). In democratic countries, there would, I imagine,
be a mighty and painful struggle to get wisdom-inquiry underway. But those who think it
1 T. S. Kuhn, 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago University Press,
Chicago.
impossible should remind themselves of what the small band of philosophes achieved in
18th century France, so few in number, and entirely lacking the professional status and
institutional backing that the great army of modern academics can take for granted.
It will be a struggle to get a hearing for wisdom-inquiry. Once that is achieved, it will
be a struggle to overcome academic opposition. Once that it is achieved, it will be a
major struggle to overcome opposition from outside universities, even in democracies.
Nevertheless, in the past, greater intellectual revolutions have been brought about in far
more difficult circumstances by, potentially, far fewer individuals: one thinks, here, of the
scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries, and the Enlightenment revolution of
the 18th century. It would be very strange indeed if we have lost the capacity to bring
about such changes in the 21st century, even though so many more of us are educated, and
communications are so much more rapid and widely diffused. Difficult? Yes! Utopian?
No!
Kościuszko concludes with a criticism of my claim that orthodox quantum theory,
because of its failure to solve the wave/particle problem, “must, as a result, rely on some
part of classical physics for a treatment of measurement” and is, as a result, “a severely
non-explanatory, disunified theory”. Kościuszko points out that quantum field theory
holds particles to be excitations of the field. This is correct but beside the point.
Quantum field theory depends on measurement, and on classical physics, just as much as
non-relativistic orthodox quantum theory does, and is thus just as non-explanatory and
disunified.2
Małgorzata Czarnocka, rather like Krzysztof Kościuszko, begins with high praise for
my work but concludes on an even more devastatingly critical note: not only is what I
argue for an impossible dream – even worse, it amounts to a totalitarian world state in
which scientists rule the world.
But both the praise and the criticism stem from extreme distortions and exaggerations
of my argument – distortions and exaggerations in direct conflict with what I actually
write, both here, in “Menace”, the article under discussion, and elsewhere. Yet again, I
must plead that my argument is much more modest than it has been taken to be. I can
only hope to establish this by means of extensive quotations so, the reader is warned,
much of what follows will consist of quotations from both Czarnocka’s article and mine.
Near the beginning of her article, Czarnocka asserts “The ideas proclaimed in the text
discussed [in] The Menace of Science without Civilization: From Knowledge to Wisdom
are more radical than in Maxwell’s earlier works, in which he announces the necessity of
a revolution only in academic researches and learning”. But this is not true. My book
From Knowledge to Wisdom, first published in 1984, opens with the sentence “Our planet
earth carries all too heavy a burden of killing, torture, enslavement, poverty, suffering, peril
and death” (Maxwell, 1984, p. 1).3 And throughout the rest of the book I make it
abundantly clear that the “from knowledge to wisdom” revolution is needed in order to
2 See p. 9 of N. Maxwell, 1988, Quantum Propensiton Theory: A Testable Resolution of
the Wave/Particle Dilemma, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 39, pp. 1-
50; available online at http://philpapers.org/archive/MAXQPT.1.pdf.
3 N. Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom, Blackwell, Oxford, p. 1; 2nd ed., 2007,
Pentire Press, London, p. 12.
correct rationality defects in academia, and thus enable academia to help promote human
welfare more effectively, intelligently and humanely. The capacity of academia to help
humanity create a better world is at the heart of the book.
Two or three sentences on, Czarnocka asserts “In Maxwell’s intellectual system
science is seen as the fundamental means of creating a new, better, more civilized human
world”. This contains a grain of truth but, as it stands, is likely to mislead, and contains
the seed of subsequent distortions. I do hold that science has an important role to play.
There are, first, its obvious roles: natural science improves our knowledge and
understanding of the universe, and of ourselves as a part of the universe, to an astonishing
extent; and natural science has, associated with it, the development of technology which
can be of immense value to humanity. There is also a much less well known role that
natural science can have: the astonishingly successful methods of science, correctly
understood and generalized, could be fruitfully exploited in life to help us realize what is
of value in life. So much for the grain of truth in what Czarnocka asserts. Let me now
indicate where what she says distorts. For me, it is not science that is “the fundamental
means of creating a new, better, more civilized human world”. In so far as anything has
that role in my “intellectual system”, it is wisdom-inquiry, and wisdom-inquiry includes
science but, very definitely, is not synonymous with science. As I make abundantly clear
in my article (and all my writings on the subject), at the heart of wisdom-inquiry,
amounting to the central, fundamental, most important part of academia, there is the
intellectual activity of (a) articulating, and improving the articulation of, our problems of
living and (b) proposing and critically assessing possible solutions – possible and actual
actions, policies, political programmes, ways of life. This is not science at all, not even
the pursuit of knowledge. Wisdom-inquiry displaces natural science from the centre of
academia and pushes it to the periphery. The academic revolution I advocate diminishes
the role and place of natural science. And social science ceases to be science, at the
fundamental level. In all these respects, Czarnocka’s assertion is deeply misleading.
And there is a further point. Even when the above quotation is corrected to say “In
Maxwell’s intellectual system wisdom-inquiry is seen as the fundamental means of
creating a new, better, more civilized human world” it still misleads. My view is that
countless diverse actions need to be performed to create a better world. If I had to select
one as the most important I would probably say that a new kind of government and
politics is needed. Transforming academia is important, but what really matters is the
transformation of our political world, and with it, our world of industry, power-
production, transport, trade, agriculture, international relations.
Czarnocka goes on to say, not quite consistently with the last quotation “Maxwell
postulates that philosophical ideas play a founding role in constituting a new, more
civilized world. In his comprehensive vision not only sciences (and the humanities?), but
also philosophy (which plays the leading role) should join transforming the human world
by proposing global, systemic remedial rules. Ideas, also philosophical ones, serve in his
conception as the foundation of all human activity.” So, now it is not just science, but
additionally, and even more, philosophy that “plays a founding role” in creating a better
world.
I do think that philosophy, properly conducted, is important. In a recent symposium on
my work I put it like this: “The proper basic task of philosophy is to articulate our most
fundamental, general and urgent problems, make clear that there are answers to these
problems implicit in much of what we do and think – implicit in science, politics, art, the
law, education and so on – these answers often being inadequate and having adverse
consequences for life and thought in various ways as a result. Philosophy should also try
to improve our attempted solutions to our fundamental problems, by imaginatively
proposing and critically assessing possible solutions, all the time making clear, where
relevant, that different possible solutions have different implications for diverse aspects
of life.”4 And to that I would add “philosophy should [seek] to help promote imaginative
and critical discussion of aims and methods in all other human endeavours as well [in
addition to science, scholarship and education] – politics, industry, law, the media, law
and so on – thus helping us quite generally to put cooperative aim-oriented rationalism
into practice in personal, social and institutional life, so that we may all the better realize
what is of value to us as we live”.5 These two tasks for philosophy are of course closely
connected. Implicit answers given to fundamental problems influence our aims; and
(problematic) aims often give implicit (and often inadequate) answers to fundamental
problems.
So Czarnocka is right to the extent, at least, that I hold philosophy, properly conducted,
to be important, for both thought and life. But does this mean that, for me, philosophy
“plays a founding role” in creating a better world? Well, I do hold that we suffer, at
present, from having built into our institutions of learning – our schools and universities –
a bad philosophy of inquiry, namely knowledge-inquiry. I argue that our capacity to
learn how to make progress towards a better world would be enhanced if we put wisdom-
inquiry into academic practice instead. To that extent, the philosophy of inquiry does
play an important, much neglected role in our capacity to create a better world. But I
would not go so far as to say that that means, for me, that philosophy is “the foundation
of all human activity”. There may be a philosophical aspect (as I have characterized
philosophy) to all that we think, experience and do, but that hardly means that philosophy
is “the foundation” of all we do. It does not mean that all our problems are philosophical
problems. Once again, what I argue for has been inflated and distorted, almost beyond all
recognition.
Czarnocka goes on to say “Maxwell proposes a radical change in the contemporary
civilization, an extraordinary world revolution which should begin, and in its founding
level also should go on in scholars’ consciousness, in the self-conversion or conversion
caused by external pressure into wise men. This revolution has to enhance the level of
humanity, probably has also to change human nature—if we presume that human nature
does not yet include wisdom as its necessary attribute. Is such a revolution possible? In
particular, is it possible without violence?” Once again, what I actually argue for in my
article, and elsewhere, is rather different, and much more modest. Confronted as we are
by grave global problems, an impending crisis for humanity, we simply cannot afford to
have, as our chief institutions of learning, universities that are damagingly irrational in a
wholesale, structural way, when judged from the standpoint of helping to promote human
4 See p. 668 of N. Maxwell, 2010, Reply to Comments on Science and the Pursuit of
Wisdom, Philosophia, vol. 38, issue 4, pp. 667-690, available online at
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/view/people/ANMAX22.date.html.
5 See From Knowledge to Wisdom, 1st ed., p. 148.; 2nd ed., p. 173.
welfare by intellectual and educational means. If it is agreed we face severe global
problems, and if it is agreed that academia is damagingly irrational when judged from the
standpoint of helping us to tackle these problems, then that ought to suffice to establish
that there is an urgent and decisive case for academic change to rid academia of its
damaging irrationality. It is to be hoped that such an academic revolution would help,
but it certainly will not suffice, as I have already indicated, to bring about “a radical
change in contemporary world civilization”, turn scholars “into wise men” or “change
human nature”.
Czarnocka then asks of the revolution in world civilization and human nature that she
(mistakenly) interprets me as arguing for: “Is such a revolution possible? In particular, is
it possible without violence?” My reply, clearly, has to be: since I am not arguing for this
world revolution, the question of violence does not really arise.
This reply is, however, a bit disingenuous. I am, after all, arguing for a revolution in
academia so that it becomes rationally designed and devoted to helping to bring about
something like the world revolution that Czarnocka has in mind. We may therefore ask:
is such a world revolution possible without violence?
As far as the role of wisdom-inquiry is concerned, I am very clear. In “Menace”, the
article under discussion, I say “A basic task for academic inquiry as a whole would be to
help humanity learn how to resolve its conflicts and problems of living in more just,
cooperatively rational ways than at present”. This is not a call for greater violence! Our
task is to make progress as best we can towards a more cooperatively rational world, and
that, in the nature of things, cannot be done by means of violence. Elsewhere I have been
even clearer on the point. The theme of cooperative rationality runs throughout my From
Knowledge to Wisdom.6 At one point I say “putting aim-oriented rationality into
practice enables us to avoid … unnecessary, destructive misunderstandings, and helps us
– if we so wish – to develop gradually more cooperative ways of resolving our conflicts.
In roughly increasing levels of desirability, conflicts between people are settled by: force,
threat, manipulation, some more or less arbitrary procedure (such as tossing a coin or voting),
bargaining, the cooperative discovery of the most desirable, just resolution. The general
adoption of the aim-oriented conception of reason is in all our long-term interests in that it
offers us the best hope of increasing our capacity to resolve our conflicts in rather more
desirable ways – even though, of course, it provides no magic procedure for resolving
conflicts”.7
But still, it may be objected, there is a problem of violence. Is not some force necessary in
order to protect individual liberty, life, democracy and justice against those who seek to
destroy these things? It is. But in all my writings on wisdom-inquiry I argue for a progressive
diminishment in the resort to force – the very opposite of what has happened in recent years in
connection with the horrendous “war against terrorism”.8 My reply to the specific point that
6 See for example 2nd ed., 2007, pp. 63-70, 121-122,181, 185, 189-190, 215-218, 221-
222, 275-276.
7 From Knowledge to Wisdom, 1984, pp. 109-110.
8 See, for example, N. Maxwell, 2007, The Disastrous War against Terrorism: Violence
versus Enlightenment, ch. 3 of Terrorism Issues: Threat Assessment , Consequences and
Czarnocka raises can be put like this. We do not know how effective wisdom-inquiry
pursued in universities around the world would be in helping us to make progress towards
as wise a world as possible, but that should not deter us from making the attempt. As I
used to tell my students, things are too desperate for us to be able to afford the luxury of
pessimism. A wiser world cannot be achieved by violence.
Czarnocka goes on to say “One might argue that ideology proposed by Maxwell is a
good one, tending to solve human problems, to create a more civilized world. However,
such a solution does not finish the dispute, but leads to other questions. There are no
universal agreement what are serious human problems nowadays, that is, problems
bothering all humanity regardless of race, social class, culture, style of live, nationality,
ethnicity, and, in general, interests related with every kind of human membership.” As I
explain in my article, it is in part because people do not agree about what our problems
are, what our aims, ideals and values should be, that we need to put aim-oriented
rationality into practice, as depicted in diagram 3. I remark “Such a hierarchical
methodology provides a framework within which competing views about what our aims
and methods in life should be—competing religious, political and moral views—may be
cooperatively assessed and tested against broadly agreed, unspecific aims (high up in the
hierarchy of aims) and the experience of personal and social life. There is the possibility of
cooperatively and progressively improving such philosophies of life (views about what is of
value in life and how it is to be achieved) much as theories are cooperatively and progressively
improved in science.” And I add “This hierarchical methodology is especially relevant to the
task of resolving conflicts about aims and ideals, as it helps disentangle agreement (high up
in the hierarchy) and disagreement (more likely to be low down in the hierarchy).” That I
recognize that there are disagreements and conflicts about what our problems are, what our
aims should be, and put forward a methodology (aim-oriented rationality) designed to help
resolve such disagreements and conflicts is entirely ignored by Czarnocka.
Next, Czarnocka asks “Is not the calling for wisdom incompatible with the rigid,
unchangeable area of human nature? Wisdom in the sense favored by Maxwell requires
above all the suppression of egoism: people would neglect their current, in principle,
egoistic individual interests, their habits, usually their styles of life and would become
wise, fighting for the better future of all humanity.” In my article, I characterize wisdom
as “the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others”. Wisdom, in
this sense, does not require the suppression of egoism. On the contrary, it requires that
we should pursue our very best interests. It is just that we should not do this if it involves
trampling over the interests of others; we should take the interests of others into account.
The real contrast I draw is not between selflessness and selfishness, as Czarnocka in
effect assumes, but rather between cooperating with others, and being unable so to
cooperate. Once again, Czarnocka distorts what I actually say.
Czarnocka goes on to make three remarks that I find quite astonishing. She says “In
short, for Maxwell wisdom approximates practical, non-intellectual wordly wisdom …
Maxwell does not explicitly include in welfare individual spiritual feelings and factors
which—as it is sometimes believed, even in the present highly consumptive Western
culture—are indispensable for really good life … his vision of welfare depreciates the
Prevention, ed. Albert W. Merkidze, Nova Science Publishers, New York, pp. 111-133,
available online at http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/view/people/ANMAX22.date.html.
autonomy and, in consequence, the validity of the spiritual dimension of human life.” I
find all this really rather extraordinary. I make clear that wisdom, as I conceive of it, is
“the capacity to realize (apprehend and create) what is of value in life” – that is, realize
means both apprehend, experience or become aware of what is of value and create or
make real what is of value. The intellectual, cultural or spiritual aspects of what is of
value are involved just as much as the practical, welfare aspects. I stress that wisdom-
inquiry is a kind of synthesis of Rationalism and Romanticism, the latter taking “its
inspiration from art, from imagination, and from passion”. I add “Wisdom-inquiry holds
art to have a fundamental rational role in inquiry, in revealing what is of value, and
unmasking false values”. And I go on “What we need, for wisdom, is an interplay of
sceptical rationality and emotion, an interplay of mind and heart, so that we may develop
mindful hearts and heartfelt minds (as I put it in my first book What’s Wrong With
Science?)”. None of this sounds as if I concentrate exclusively on practical, non-
intellectual, worldly wisdom, as Czarnocka maintains. But what makes her charge really
strange is that I devote a whole section of my article to “Inquiry Pursued for Its Own
Sake”, as the section is called, to inquiry devoted to helping us apprehend or experience
what is of value, the intellectual, cultural or spiritual aspect of what is of value. And I
argue that wisdom-inquiry does better justice to this aspect than knowledge-inquiry does.
And I give a number of reasons in support of this claim. I say, for example, that “From
the standpoint of inquiry pursued for its own sake, the intellectual or cultural aspect of
inquiry, what really matters is the desire that people have to see, to know, to understand,
the passionate curiosity that individuals have about aspects of the world, and the
knowledge and understanding that people acquire and share as a result of actively
following up their curiosity”. I remark that one way in which wisdom-inquiry does better
justice to inquiry pursued for its own sake is by “recognizing that passion, emotion and
desire, have a rational role to play in inquiry, disinterested research being a myth”. And I
quote Einstein’s declaration that “The most beautiful experience we can have is the
mysterious. It is the fundamental emotion which stands at the cradle of true art and true
science”. I go on to argue that “In order to enhance our understanding of persons as
beings of value, potentially and actually, we need to understand them empathetically, by
putting ourselves imaginatively into their shoes, and experiencing, in imagination, what
they feel, think, desire, fear, plan, see, love and hate. For wisdom-inquiry, this kind of
empathic understanding is rational and intellectually fundamental” in a way it is not for
knowledge-inquiry. All this makes nonsense of the claim that I neglect the intellectual,
cultural or spiritual aspects of what is of value and concentrate only on practical welfare
aspects. If what I say elsewhere is taken into account, it becomes even more absurd: see
for example my attempt at characterizing what I conjecture to be of value in existence in
chapter 10 of my From Knowledge to Wisdom, or chapter 4 of my Cutting God in Half –
And Putting the Pieces Together Again, or chapter 2 of my The Human World in the
Physical Universe. Or see the whole of my What’s Wrong With Science?, the subtitle of
which is Towards a People’s Rational Science of Delight and Compassion.9 When my
9 N. Maxwell, 1976, What’s Wrong With Science?, Bran’s Head Books, Hayes, UK;
2001, The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and
Evolution, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland; 2010, Cutting God in Half – And
From Knowledge to Wisdom was first published in 1984, it received a glowing review in
Nature, in which the reviewer said “Nicholas Maxwell has breached the conventions of
philosophical writing by using, with intent, such loaded words as ‘wisdom’, ‘suffering’
and ‘love’. ‘That which is of value in existence, associated with human life, is incon-
ceivably, unimaginably, richly diverse in character.’ What an un-academic proposition
to flow from the pen of a lecturer in the philosophy of science; but what a condemnation of
the academic outlook, that this should be so”10 That hardly sounds like an author
concerned exclusively with the practical aspects of welfare.
Czarnocka then says “Should we agree—in order to accept Maxwell’s project—that
there is the one universal model of welfare and happiness, common for all humanity?
Should we promote the model developed in Western liberal culture as the only formula of
welfare and happiness?” I have I hope already said enough to make clear that aim-
oriented rationality and wisdom-inquiry are designed to help all of us to live as “richly
diverse” lives as we may wish as long as we do so in such a way that we are in accord
with – we do not trample over – the lives of others.
Czarnocka goes on to say “He does not take into consideration that civilizations,
societies and social structures are immensely complex systems linked by internal
interactions, and having diverse sources of dynamizing. Especially, he neglects the role
of political authorities, capitalists and their mercenaries who subordinate—manifestly or
in various hidden ways—the rest of humanity.” I have no idea where Czarnocka gets this
idea from. A major part of the point of the academic revolution I argue for is to bring
into existence a kind of academia devoted to helping populations discover how to bring
effective pressure on governments, capitalists, banks, and others, so that policies may be
pursued effective in progressively resolving current global problems, and helping us
make progress towards as good a world as possible. It is precisely because of the
immense complexity of our global world, and the power of vested interests concealed,
often, behind smokescreens of deception, that we so urgently need to learn how to deal,
intelligently and effectively, with this complexity and these powers, which in turn
requires that we have an academic enterprise devoted to the task
Czarnocka then says “Maxwell regards sciences as responsible for all current human
troubles. More concretely, in his view only scientists oriented by knowledge-paradigm,
and not by wisdom-paradigm cause the approaching civilizational catastrophe. And only
scholars (only scientists?) might remedy the evil by a global intellectual revolution,
which would change radically the current global civilization”. But this, once again,
blatantly misrepresents what I actually say. What I do say is that “global problems have
been made possible by science”, and “made possible” very definitely does not mean
solely “responsible for”. It very definitely does not mean “only scientists…cause the
approaching civilizational catastrophe”. In fact I go on to say “Some blame science for
our problems, but this profoundly misses the point”. And to attribute to me the view that
“only scholars might remedy the evil” is absurd. This is to attribute to me the view that
wisdom-inquiry suffices to bring about a better world which, as I have already explained,
Putting the Pieces Together Again: A New Approach to Philosophy, Pentire Press,
London.
10 C. Longuet-Higgins, 1984, For Goodness Sake, Nature, vol. 312, p. 204.
is nonsense. I do not even hold that wisdom-inquiry is necessary. My thesis, far more
modestly, is that it can only help to correct the damaging, structural irrationality of
knowledge-inquiry. Our situation is too urgent, too desperate, for us to continue to
overlook this source of assistance.
Czarnocka says next “Maxwell ascribes to science power and the possibility of
deciding about the world. However, science has not, never had and cannot have the status
of a universal ruler”. This is so blatantly at odds with what I do say in so many ways I
hardly know where to begin. First, the transition from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-
inquiry removes science from its central place and role in academia. This is, in part
because social science ceases, fundamentally, to be science at all, and becomes the
enterprise of articulating problems of living and proposing and criticizing possible
solutions. It is also, in part, because natural science ceases to be intellectually
fundamental. Social inquiry, pursued in the way I have indicated, becomes intellectually
more fundamental than natural science. All this is made abundantly clear in my article.
So, at most, it is academics (who are not scientists) who are to rule the world. But this
too is blatantly at odds with what I actually say. I say repeatedly that a basic task of
wisdom-inquiry is to help promote more cooperatively rational tackling of problems of
living – hardly compatible with ruling. And I say “What really matters, of course, is the
thinking we engage in as we live, at the individual, social and global level, guiding our
actions. It is this socially active thinking we need to improve. The whole point of
academic thought, from the perspective of wisdom-inquiry, is to help improve
humanity’s socially active thinking guiding action. Academic problem-solving is a
specialized bit of human problem-solving quite generally; there thus needs to be a two-
way interaction between the two, in accordance with rule (4). The proper basic task of
universities is public education about what our problems are, and what we need to do
about them, by means of discussion and debate. Universities need to become somewhat
like a people’s civil services, doing openly for the public what actual civil services are
supposed to do, in secret, for governments. Academia would have just sufficient power to
be independent of government, industry, the military, the media and the public, but no
more.” What really matters, and what is really fundamental, is the thinking we engage in
as we live, guiding our actions – which involves, if anything, a diminishment in status of
academia, and certainly not an increase in power. Wisdom-inquiry academia is there to
help, to be called upon to assist us in our efforts to solve our problems of learning. It has
as much to learn from us non-academics, as we have to learn from it (interactions going
in both directions). All this is utterly at odds with Czarnocka’s claim that I hold that
scientists, or academics, should rule the world. Czarnocka goes on to claim that I assert
that academics should rule the world in points 18 and 19 of my list of changes that need
to be made, in my view, to academia. But there I speak of virtual governments, taking
virtual actions and proposing virtual legislation. Their role is to propose, to argue for, to
suggest and criticize, “free of the constraints of power” as I say, not of course, to enact,
to enforce. I say, quite explicitly, to repeat: “Academia would have just sufficient power
to be independent of government, industry, the military, the media and the public, but no
more”.
It goes on, but I have said enough, I hope, to make clear that Czarnocka distorts and
misrepresents what I say in my article to a quite extreme extent.
I come now to Szymon Wróbel’s article. Wróbel is correct in pointing out that, unlike
some other critics of Rationalism or the Enlightenment – Nietzsche, Michel Foucault,
Jacques Derrida and others – I hold that we suffer, not from too much reason, but from
not enough. In my view, what is widely taken to be rationality, whether by those who
support it or deplore it, is actually a characteristic kind of irrationality masquerading as
rationality.
Wróbel is also correct in pointing out that there is an overlap in Habermas’s views and
mine. Habermas’s intersubjectivity and communicative reason have some things in
common with my person-to-person understanding.11 But there are also dramatic
differences. I have found nothing like my central argument, which takes us from
standard to aim-oriented empiricism, to aim-oriented rationalism and wisdom-inquiry, in
Habermas.
Wróbel goes on to make a number of points with which I can only disagree. He says
“It seems, therefore, that for Maxwell there are two kinds of knowledge and two types of
rationality – the knowledge in the traditional sense that is instrumentally used to describe
the reality and the reflexive knowledge serving social goals that may one day aspire to
become wisdom. The first type of knowledge corresponds to strategic rationality and the
second to communication rationality as understood by Habermas.” I don’t go along with
the two kinds of knowledge and reason that Wróbel has in mind here. I do argue for (at
least) two kinds of understanding: scientific and person-to-person, but that is rather
different. I also argue that these two kinds of understanding are intimately inter-
dependent. Both are fundamental, and both are involved, however adequately or
inadequately, in the two kinds of inquiry I discuss.12 I do appeal to two inter-related
notions of rationality – problem-solving and aim-oriented rationality – but these are not
the two notions that Wróbel attributes to me.
Wróbel declares “What bothers [Maxwell] is not the lack of knowledge but knowledge
based on narrowly understood rationality which is existentially and socially useless”. But
my objection to knowledge-inquiry is not that it is based on a “narrowly understood
rationality” but that it is irrational. It violates three of the four elementary rules of
reason I indicate; and it violates aim-oriented rationality in a quite elementary fashion in
misrepresenting the real, problematic aims of science. In addition, I would never say that
scientific knowledge, acquired within the framework of knowledge-inquiry, is “socially
11 In construing reason to be social in character, Habermas is not, however, making an
original point. Something like this can be found in J. d’Alembert, 1963, Preliminary
Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, (originally
published in 1751). Popper, too, is at pains to stress the social character of reason: see K.
R. Popper, 1962, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol 2, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, pp. 216-220 and 224-228 (originally published in 1945).
12 See, for example, From Knowledge to Wisdom, 1st ed., pp. 184-189 and 264-267; or
2nd ed., pp. 206-213 and 285-288. See also The Human World in the Physical Universe,
ch. 5.
useless”. Quite a lot, no doubt, is, inevitably and quite properly13, but much scientific
knowledge is, in my view, of profound social value. And we need to remember that
science is of human value in three ways: intellectually, practically via technological and
other applications, and methodologically (as a guide to how we should go about learning
or making progress quite generally).
Wróbel declares that “it is impossible to claim that there exists a general structure of
reasoning”, and to back this up he cites criticism of classical reason, and critical remarks
of Rorty, Sellars, Davidson, Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Foucault. I take this to
mean that what I have to say about scientific method, scientific rationality, and rationality
more generally, cannot be adequate, cannot be sufficient for what I set out to do. This is
a charge that it is very difficult for me to answer, as Wróbel here makes no specific
criticism of my views at all. I can but point out that I have argued, at some length, that
aim-oriented empiricism succeeds in solving a range of fundamental problems that have
defeated rival views14, and is a considerable improvement over the views of Popper,
Kuhn and Lakatos. As for rationality, the conception that I require for the argument I
develop is one which holds that there are rather general methods, strategies or rules
which, if put into practice, give us our best chance of solving our problems or realizing
our aims. They guide us, but do not prescribe what we must do, and are not infallible.
They are meta-methods, in that they presuppose there is a multitude of methods we can
already implement successfully in performing diverse actions in the real world, and these
meta-methods of reason help us marshal what we can already do to solve new problems,
perform new actions, realize new or modified aims. The specific notions of rationality
my argument appeals to are generalized from the progress-achieving methods of science.
The specific four rules of rational problem solving I cite are, I claim, uncontroversial to
the point of banality. It is all the more striking that knowledge-inquiry violates three of
these rules in a wholesale, structural way. Astonishingly, Wróbel makes no comment on
this central plank of my argument. There is certainly not a hint as to how the arguments
of Rorty, Sellars and company have the slightest bearing on the validity of the four rules,
or on the disaster of academia violating three of them in a structural way.
Wróbel suggests that wisdom conceived of as “the capacity to realize what is of value
in life” falls short of Aristotle’s notion of knowing how to live well. I am puzzled as to
how this can be. If “living well” and “knowing how to live well” are of value, then they
come within the compass of wisdom, as I have characterized it.
I am very surprised that Wróbel should say “following the reading of From Knowledge
to Wisdom we are left with no clues how on earth the growth of knowledge is supposed to
reconcile with the growth of wisdom”. What wisdom-inquiry consists in, how it differs
13 We cannot always know, in advance that scientific research will result in socially
valuable knowledge, and if we restricted research to that which we know will result in
knowledge of value, scientific progress of a valuable kind would be undermined.
14 See N. Maxwell, 1998, The Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of
Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford; 2004, Is Science Neurotic?, Imperial College
Press, London, especially the appendix; From Knowledge to Wisdom, 2nd ed., ch. 14;
2012, Has Science Established that the Cosmos is Physically Comprehensible?, in Recent
Advances in Cosmology, Nova Science, New York: http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.1747.
from knowledge-inquiry, how objections are to be countered, problems solved, and a host
of other relevant matters, are discussed in great detail in that book. But as Wróbel says
nothing about what his problem is in reconciling the growth of knowledge and wisdom, it
is, once again, impossible for me to respond.
I am also somewhat astonished that Wróbel should say “Maxwell also leaves out an
often discussed thesis put forward by sociologists of science according to which
specialization is at the heart of modern abstract systems. The fact that all one can hope
for in such a system is acquiring an expert position within one or two petty fields of
modern system of knowledge means that for the majority the abstract systems remain
vastly impenetrable.” Three of my four rules of rational problem-solving are designed to
counteract specialization: one rule, only, recommends it. Wróbel might have a look at
my article “Science, Reason, Knowledge and Wisdom: A Critique of Specialism”,15
published long ago in 1980 (and originally intended to be a chapter of From Knowledge
to Wisdom).
Wróbel declares: “It remains a mystery how Nicholas Maxwell plans to reconcile the
idea of good life based on wisdom with the requirements of liberal society and liberal
principle of justice. Yet another is whether he aims to sacrifice the ideal of a liberal
society, with its principle of impartiality and neutrality at the helm, in order to boost the
state with wisdom and ethics.” I am baffled. What kind of good life would one have that
is not based on a liberal society and justice? The good life of an autocrat, a plutocrat, or a
dictator? As for the idea that liberalism demands that impartiality and neutrality be at the
helm, that seems to me to be a misconception about what we should take liberalism to be.
Liberalism for me is based on the idea that what is of supreme value in existence is the
individual person – the flourishing of the individual life. But it is also, for me, based on
the idea that much that is of most value in life is only realized to the extent that we live
together – if not in friendship, and with love, then at least in a just and cooperatively
rational way. Judgements of value are at the heart of liberalism, properly conceived; such
judgements cease to be mere prejudices when they are subjected to the scrutiny of aim-
oriented rationality.16
Wróbel goes on to declare: “When Maxwell posits that „A basic task for academic
inquiry as a whole would be to help humanity learn how to resolve its conflicts and
problems of living in more just, cooperatively rational ways than at present”, and when
he adds that „Wisdom-inquiry embodies a synthesis of traditional Rationalism and
Romanticism”, this certainly should read as an expression of his noble moral demands.
However, he does not say a thing about how to fulfill these demands.” Not true. I have
demonstrated that academic inquiry as it exists by and large today is deeply flawed, in a
major, structural and very damaging way when judged from the standpoint of helping to
promote human welfare, and I have spelled out in considerable detail the changes that
need to be made if we are to have an academic enterprise well-designed and properly
15 N. Maxwell, 1980, Science, Reason, Knowledge and Wisdom: A Critique of
Specialism, Inquiry, vol. 23, pp. 19-81.
16 What I say here, so briefly, about values and liberalism, is spelled out in more detail in
my From Knowledge to Wisdom, ch. 10.
functioning when judged from this standpoint.17 Given all this, I find it astonishing that
Wróbel should declare that I do “not say a thing about how to fulfill these demands” of
what I set out to do. I have made it entirely clear that aim-oriented rationality and
wisdom-inquiry, if put into practice in universities around the world, would be no instant,
magic cure of all the world’s ills. Appreciating that, however, does not seem to me to be
sufficient grounds for turning one’s back on the gross and damaging irrationality of
academia today, and following instead the advice of a Leo Strauss.
Andrew Targowski does not just write about wisdom. In his article, he tells us about
an undergraduate honours course in wisdom he set up and taught at Western Michigan
University in the Spring of 2012. He is to be congratulated for this initiative. In his
article, Targowski also gives a brief sketch of the recent history of the academic study of
wisdom, and indicates his views about the nature, role and value of wisdom, how it
differs from knowledge and intelligence, and how it can be conceived of in both personal
and social terms.
A few years ago, Robert Sternberg remarked “If there is anything the world needs, it
is wisdom. Without it, I exaggerate not at all in saying that very soon, there may be no
world.”18 It is no doubt considerations along these lines that have led Sternberg,
Targowski and a number of others, in recent years, to take up the academic study of
wisdom, and develop courses devoted to teaching for wisdom in universities. If the
world is to acquire vitally needed wisdom – so it is implicitly assumed – we first need to
know what wisdom is, and how it is to be acquired. We need more knowledge about
wisdom.
I view this growing research programme into improving knowledge about wisdom
with mixed feelings. It is undoubtedly, from my point of view, a step in the right
direction. But it is also, as I see it, a somewhat inadequate response to the impending
crises we face. It is very much a knowledge-inquiry initiative. For, the basic idea is: If
we are to become wiser, we must first improve our knowledge about wisdom. That is the
central tenet of knowledge-inquiry: first, acquire knowledge; then apply it to help solve
social problems.
What we need is something much more radical. Instead of improving knowledge
about wisdom, and teaching for wisdom, within the current framework of knowledge-
inquiry, what we need to do is bring about the comprehensive intellectual/institutional
revolution in academia so that the whole enterprise becomes rationally devoted to seeking
and promoting wisdom by intellectual and educational means. Improving knowledge
about wisdom within the current framework of knowledge-inquiry is not an adequate
substitute for wisdom-inquiry.
At this point I should perhaps confess that, for me, wisdom is very much an after-
thought, a side issue. My central concern is the damaging irrationality of science, and of
academic inquiry more generally, when judged from the standpoint of helping to promote
human welfare, and the urgent need to bring about an academic revolution so that we
may come to have universities rationally devoted to helping us achieve what is of value
17 See especially my From Knowledge to Wisdom.
18 R. J. Sternberg, 2003, Wisdom, Intelligence, and Creativity Synthesized, Cambridge
University Press, New York, p. xviii.
in life. When I first spelled out this argument in my first book What’s Wrong With
Science? In 1976, I made no use of the notion of “wisdom” at all. Only later, for my
second book published in 1984, casting around for a word to stand for the basic aim of
the kind of inquiry I argued for – to help enhance “the capacity, and the active desire, to
realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others”, did it occur to me that I might
employ the word “wisdom” to stand for this capacity, this aim. I did so reluctantly, well
aware that “wisdom” comes with all sorts of undesirable associations.19
So, I am enormously encouraged by those who, like Sternberg, Targowski and others,
seek to improve academic knowledge about wisdom, and promote teaching for wisdom,
within the current framework of knowledge-inquiry. But at the same time I am firmly of
the view that something much more radical is required if humanity is to learn how to
make progress towards a wiser world.20
I come, finally, to Anna Michalska’s essay. Michalska begins with an exposition of
the conception of science I advocate – aim-oriented empiricism (AOE). She clearly
thoroughly understands the basic idea. I might myself formulate some things slightly
differently, and there are one or two points of fine detail with which I disagree. For
example, the metaphysical thesis at the top of the hierarchy of theses of AOE is, despite
what Michalska says, a thesis about the entire cosmos: it asserts that the cosmos is such
that we can acquire some knowledge of our local circumstances. It is not always
appreciated that even our most trivial items of common sense knowledge imply some
knowledge of the entire cosmos. I would ordinarily be said to know that this pebble, that
I hold in the palm of my hand, will continue to exist for the next minute. But this implies
that nowhere in the universe is there an explosion which will travel at near infinite speed
to engulf and destroy the earth and the stone in my hand in under a minute. I only know
the statement about the pebble if I know what it implies, the statement about the cosmos.
Thus, even our most trivial items of common sense knowledge contain some implicit
knowledge about the entire cosmos.
Michalska goes on, in section 2 of her essay, to make a number of interesting points
about implications that AOE may be held to have for a variety of issues having to do with
such matters as rationality, the heuristics of problem solving, decision making and
planning, the physical comprehensibility of the universe, the relationship between science
and the philosophy of science. The key feature of AOE that I wish to stress is this: the
basic aims of science are permanently and profoundly problematic; we need, therefore, to
try to improve the aims (and associated methods) of science as we proceed; the best way
to do this is to represent aims – or problematic assumptions inherent in aims – in the form
of a hierarchy, these aims (or assumption) becoming less and less problematic as we go
up the hierarchy. This provides us with a framework of relatively unproblematic aims
and methods (high up in the hierarchy) within which much more problematic aims and
19 For an account of my struggles to develop and communicate the “knowledge to
wisdom” argument, see N. Maxwell, 2012, Arguing for Wisdom in the University: An
Intellectual Autobiography, Philosophia, vol. 40, no. 4; available at
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/view/people/ANMAX22.date.html.
20 For a more detailed expression of my reservations, see N. Maxwell, forthcoming,
Misconceptions concerning Wisdom, http://philpapers.org/archive/MAXMCW.1.doc.
methods (low down in the hierarchy) may be improved as we proceed, there being, as
Michalska stresses, something like positive feedback between improving knowledge, and
improving aims and methods – improving knowledge about how to improve knowledge.
In order to appreciate what it is that has made it possible for science to be so successful –
the rationality of science – it is essential that we see the philosophy of science (the study
of the aims and methods of science) as an important, integral part of science itself. We
need to recreate natural philosophy!
Michalska goes on to argue that AOE demands a new theory of language. Quine’s
theory cannot do justice to AOE, but Habermas’s theory can. I am not sure that I can
follow Michalska here into this linguistic territory. It has always seemed to me that the
great sin of philosophy is to put forward a theory of meaning, of language, which then, in
a subtle, underhand way, becomes something quite different, a criterion of
meaningfulness and a tool to demolish philosophical problems. This is the great flaw in
David Hume’s Treatise, in many ways that rare thing, a work of philosophy exhibiting
great intellectual integrity. The flaw is everywhere apparent in Wittgenstein, and in the
works of the logical positivists and logical empiricists, including Carnap and Quine. I am
not convinced that AOE creates any special problems for the theory of meaning and
language, but certainly any theory that hopes to be adequate must be able to
accommodate linguistic activity associated with AOE, and science. I am not convinced
that, for this, one needs to appeal to Habermas.
Michalska next declares that my conception of philosophical analysis is very similar
to that of Collingwood’s. There are some things in Collingwood’s work that I admire, so
I am happy to entertain the possibility that we have the same conception of philosophical
analysis. However, from what Michalska has to say about Collingwood, I did not
recognize my own views about philosophy, already hinted at above.
In the final section of her essay, Michalska is critical of my “from knowledge to
wisdom” thesis. I found her criticism puzzling, and I am not sure I have understood it.
She says I hold that knowledge-inquiry needs to be “replaced by wisdom-inquiry as
entailed by AOE”. But I would never hold that AOE implies wisdom-inquiry. She says
that my “diagnosis is that the whole philosophical tradition we subscribe to is more or
less permeated with the fallacious supposition that scientific method … is the very
essence of rationality”. But this is not my diagnosis at all. Quite the contrary, I take
scientific method as I construe it in terms of AOE as a paradigmatic exemplification of
rationality. The conception of rationality I espouse, aim-oriented rationality (AOR), is a
generalization of AOE. Here, I tread a path parallel to Popper’s, as I have explained
elsewhere.21 Just as Popper generalized falsificationism, his conception of scientific
method, to arrive at critical rationalism, so I generalize AOE to arrive at AOR. And it is
AOR that is at the heart of wisdom-inquiry, not AOE, as Michalska seems to suppose.
Michalska goes on to ask of wisdom-inquiry “Where did all the feedback loops go?”.
They are still there. My fourth rule of rational problem-solving requires specialized and
fundamental problem-soving to influence each other. All the arrows of influence in
diagram 1 go in both directions. AOR inherits from AOE all the feedback loops inherent
in the latter. Michalska says I hold that “science should devote itself to advancing mere
21 See my Arguing for Wisdom in the University.
technicalities”. But, as I have already mentioned, there is a whole section of “Menace”,
my article under discussion, devoted to arguing that wisdom-inquiry does better justice to
inquiry pursued for its own sake than does knowledge-inquiry – and I make it clear that
that includes natural science. Michalska asks “how can one simply make a list of the
most urgent, global problems to be solved—AIDS epidemics, climate change etc.—and
expect that all scientist gather together to find a universally applicable cure for these?”,
the presumption being that I hold that this is what wisdom-inquiry should do. There are
at least two things wrong with this. First, I state very clearly in “Menace” that it is
human actions that, fundamentally, solve our problems of living – even when new
scientific knowledge and technology are required. Wisdom-inquiry, fundamentally,
seeks to help solve problems of living by imaginatively articulating and critically
assessing possible actions, policies, political programmes, philosophies of life – not
exactly science. Second, I state very clearly that getting a clearer idea about what our
problems of living are is absolutely basic to wisdom-inquiry. My first rule of rational
problem-solving, basic to wisdom-inquiry, says “Articulate, and try to improve the
articulation of, the problem to be solved”.22 The basic idea of aim-oriented rationality
(AOR) is that, because aims in life are often inherently problematic, we need to try to
improve aims as we act, the hierarchical meta-methodology of AOR, inherited from
AOE, being designed specifically to help us to do just that. As we improve our aims, so
we improve the way we formulate our problems. I do, of course, begin my article with a
list of what I take to be major problems facing humanity, but I do that to motivate what
follows: it is not intended to depict how wisdom-inquiry should proceed. Once again,
Michalska seems to have misunderstood quite seriously the character of wisdom-inquiry.
What she singularly fails to do is criticize my two arguments that highlight the damaging
rationality defects inherent in knowledge-inquiry – defects which require, for their
removal, the adoption and implementation of wisdom-inquiry.
22 In addition, there will be feedback in both directions between social inquiry and
natural science, in accordance with rule 4 of rational problem-solving. As a result of
improving our understanding of what our problems of living are, we may well come to
change priorities of scientific research; and as a result of improvements in scientific
knowledge, we may well come to change our ideas about what our most urgent problems
of living are.
